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ECONOMIC INJURY IN FCC LICENSING: THE PUBLIC
INTEREST IGNORED *
THE Federal Communications Commission has responsibility for securing
the most efficient use of broadcasting facilities.1 Permission to construct and
operate a radio or television station may be obtained only through a showing that
the proposed station will serve the "public interest, convenience, or necessity."
'2
Persons who would be adversely affected by the operation of a new station
may protest approval of the application.3 While economic injury to the pro-
testant is not in itself ground for denying the license,4 the question has arisen
*Southeastern Enterprises (WCLE), 13 PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 139 (March
20, 1957), temporary stay order granted pending appeal on merits sub nora. Fitch & Kile,
Inc. v. FCC, No. 13868, D.C. Cir., June 5, 1957, program test authorization revoked, 15
PIKE & FISCHER RADIO REG. 248 (June 6, 1957), stay order vacated on rehearing, Fitch
& Kile, Inc. v. FCC, No. 13868, D.C. Cir., June 26, 1957. (PIKE & FIscHER RADIO REG.
hereinafter cited as RADIO REG.)
1. The FCC was created "to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communi-
cation service . . . ." 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1952). See
also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943) : "The avowed
aim of the Communications Act of 1934 was to secure the maximum benefits of radio to
all the people of the United States. To that end Congress endowed the Communications
Commission with comprehensive powers to promote and realize the vast potentialities of
radio. Section 303(g) provides that the Commission shall 'generally encourage the larger
and more effective use of radio in the public interest .... .' "
2. 48 STAT. 1084, 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 308, 309 (1952), as amended,
47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (Supp. IV, 1957); 48 STAT. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1952)
(station licenses) ; 48 STAT. 1089 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 319 (1952) (construc-
tion permits). The same standard must be met in applying for license renewals, 48 STAT.
1084 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1952), transfers, 48 STAT. 1086 (1934),
as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1952), and modifications of construction permits and
licenses, 48 STAT. 1084 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 308 (1952).
The Communications Act does not contain the word "television," but its use of the term
"radio" has been construed to include television. Allen B. Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v.
Carroll, 184 F.2d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951).
3. The Commission may grant a license on the basis of an application alone or call
a hearing in which the applicant must prove his fitness. At such a hearing, other parties
in interest may offer evidence "protesting" the application. When the application is
granted without hearing, the grant is subject to protest for a period of thirty days.
When a protest contains facts which, if proved, would be grounds for setting the grant
aside, a hearing will be held on the issues raised by protestant, and the license grant
suspended pending outcome of the protest. Where the public interest requires, however,
the grant may remain in effect. 48 STAT. 1084, 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§
308, 309 (1952), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 309(c) (Supp. IV, 1957). See note 32 infra.
4. "[E]conomic injury to a rival station is not, in and of itself, and apart from con-
siderations of public convenience, interest, or necessity, an element the [Commission] ...
must weigh, and as to which it must make findings, in passing on an application for
a broadcasting license." FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 473 (1940).
However, such economic injury does give the station standing to protest Commission
action. Id. at 477.
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whether applications should be rejected when the likelihood of such injury
threatens the public interest.5
5. The public interest standard was originally assumed to enable the Commission
to protect stations against undesirable competition. WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 109 F.2d 665,
666-68 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (dictum); Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 107 F.2d 956,
957-58 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (dictum); Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 96 F.2d 564,
566 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (dictum) ; Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. FCC, 94 F.2d 249, 251-52 (D.C.
Cir. 1937) (dictum) ; Great Western Broadcasting Ass'n v. FCC, 94 F.2d 244, 248 (D.C.
Cir. 1937) (dictum). But dicta in FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, supra note 4,
the only Supreme Court pronouncement on the subject, cast doubt on the validity of
these assertions:
"[T]he broadcasting field is open to anyone, provided there be an available frequency
over which he can broadcast without interference to others, if he shows his competency,
the adequacy of his equipment, and financial ability to make good use of the assigned
channel.
Congress intended to leave competition in the business of broadcasting where
it found it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering electrically with other broad-
casters to survive or succumb according to his ability to make his programs attractive
to the public." Id. at 475.
However, the Court went on to say that results of competition could sometimes be
relevant under the public interest standard:
"This is not to say that the question of competition between a proposed station and
one operating under an existing license is to be entirely disregarded by the Commission,
and, indeed, the Commission's practice shows that it does not disregard that question.
It may have a vital and important bearing upon the ability of the applicant adequately to
serve his public; it may indicate that both stations-the existing and the proposed-will
go under, with the result that a portion of the listening public will be left without adequate
service. These matters, however, are distinct from the consideration that, if a license
be granted, competition between the licensee and any other existing station may cause
economic loss to the latter." Id. at 475-76.
Since Sanders, lower courts have differed on the significance of economic injury affect-
ing the public. Compare Colorado Radio Corp. v. FCC, 118 F.2d 24, 26 & n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1941) (dictum; Sanders asserts economic injury may be relevant to the public interest),
with Stahlman v. FCC, 126 F.2d 124, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (dictum; applicant who
possesses minimum qualifications must be given an available frequency; Sandcrs stands
for free competition in broadcasting). M1ore recently, however, the cases before Sanders,
and Sanders itself, were deemed authority for considering economic injury adversely affect-
ing the public as ground for denying licenses. In Democrat Printing Co. v. FCC, 202
F.2d 298, 302 & n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1952), a commission finding that electrical interference
resulting from licensing applicant did not cause serious economic injury to existing
station was held invalid because based on insufficient evidence. On remand to the Commis-
sion, the economic injury issue was excluded as conjectural and not timely raised; hearing
was held on the electrical interference issue. Texas Star Broadcast Co., 9 RADIO REG. 373,
979 (1953).
The Commission has used Sanders to support its contention that economic injury is
irrelevant. See, e.g., Presque Isle Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 3, 8 (1940); The Evening
News Ass'n, 8 F.C.C. 552, 555 (1941). Yet the opposite view has not been without support
among its members. See, e.g., The Voice of Cullman, 14 F.C.C. 770, 777 (1950) (con-
curring opinion). Furthermore, in most cases, such reliance on Sanders was buttressed
by insufficiency of evidence that the applicant would cause economic injury resulting in
harm to the public. Independent Broadcasting Co., 9 F.C.C. 40 (1941) ; United Theatres,
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In Southeastern Enterprises (WCLE), the Commission disclaimed power
to protect a station from competition irrespective of the potential effect on
the public.0 The case arose out of an application for a radio station construc-
tion permit in Cleveland, Tennessee. Protestant, WBAC, furnished the only
local service, although Cleveland was also served by stations in other com-
munities. WBAC alleged that the entry of a local competitor would decrease
its share of advertising revenue in the Cleveland market. 7 It asked the Com-
mission to determine whether Cleveland could support two stations or whether
an inadequacy of advertising revenue might result, which, by causing either
or both stations to fail or to render inferior service, would ultimately harm the
public.8
The FCC denied authority to consider these issues and declined to make
findings on them. Financial data necessary for such consideration, it suggested,
could be obtained only through a regulation of accounts similar to that imposed
on common carriers under the authority of the Communications Act.9 Since
Inc., 8 F.C.C. 489 (1941); Burlington Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 366 (1941); Sentinel
Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 140 (1940). And the cases often do not clearly reveal
whether Sanders merely prevents restrictions on competition when no public injury will
result, or if it prohibits protecting stations from any competition even when serious public
harm is likely. See, e.g., The Voice of Cullman, supra at 775: "We are forced to conclude
from a careful consideration of the pleadings in this proceeding that despite protestations
to the contrary, petitioner is seeking a hearing for the purpose of showing that it is entitled
to be protected against competition; this claim runs squarely against the Supreme Court's
holding in the Sanders Bros. case."
6. 13 RADIO REG. 139 (March 20, 1957), temporary stay order granted pending appeal
on merits sub nora. Fitch & Kile, Inc. v. FCC, No. 13868, D.C. Cir., June 5, 1957, program
test authorication revoked, 15 RADIO REG. 248 (June 6, 1957), stay order vacated on re-
hearing, Fitch & Kite, Inc. v. FCC, No. 13868, D.C. Cir., June 26, 1957.
7. Id. at 140-42.
S. Protestant's evidence on these issues included an extensive study entitled "Economic
Analysis of Potential Demand for Radio Advertising in Cleveland, Tennessee" prepared
by Howard S. Dye, Professor of Economics at the University of Tennessee. Brief for
Appellant, Attachment No. 1, Fitch & Kilte, Inc. v. FCC, No. 13868, D.C. Cir., June 5,
1957 (hereinafter cited as Dye Report). The study purported to establish that "the sale
of radio advertising in the Cleveland area has about reached the saturation point, and
that the advent of an additional radio station in the area can prove successful only through
a serious and probably injurious encroachment upon the customers and total sales of
station WBAC." Dye Report 33. The study was based on statistics showing population
and income trends, evaluation of the competition faced by local merchants from the neigh-
boring market area of Chattanooga, analysis of the types of businesses in the area and
their ability to support radio advertising, and questionnaires probing attitudes of potential
advertisers on the amount of advertising contemplated and the proportion to be spent on
radio. Protestant also offered evidence which indicated customers reducing advertising on
WBAC to advertise on the new station, encroachment on WBAC revenues from this re-
duction and programming cuts which would have to be made to conserve operating costs at
levels commensurate with reduced revenues. Brief for Appellant, Attachments 2-4, Fitch
& Kile, Inc. v. FCC, supra.
9. 13 RADIO REa. at 150-51.
"[T]o interpret the Act as protestant urges inevitably results in the application of
common carrier or public utility concepts to the broadcasting industry-a contradiction
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section 153(h) of the act excludes broadcasting from common carrier status, 10
the Commission concluded that Congress intended broadcasting to be a field
of free competition and gave the regulatory agency no power to mitigate its
effects." Moreover, protection of stations against competition, even when in
the public interest, was said to be repugnant to antitrust policy as recognized
by the Communications Act.'
2
Neither antitrust policy nor section 153(h), however, supports the FCC's
conclusions. The antitrust provisions of the Communications Act, designed to
prevent great concentration of power in the industry,' 3 have long been held
which cannot be read into the Act by interpretive construction or superimposed by ad-
ministrative action." Id. at 149. "What must be considered in achieving the one objective
[common carrier regulation] is not permissible in reaching the objectives of the other
[radio regulation]." Ibid.
The Commission also argued that if both stations could not survive and it were
called upon to consider this fact in licensing, it in effect would have to choose between
stations. This choice, it maintained, would imply later public utility regulation of the
selected station to ensure that the promised service would be forthcoming. Id. at 151.
Yet, the same type of choice is made whenever two or more applicants seek a single
frequency, and the Commission has not felt public utility regulation necessary in these
cases.
10. " 'Common carrier' or 'carrier' means any person engaged as a common carrier
for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in interstate or
foreign radio transmission of energy, except where reference is made to common carriers
not subject to this Act; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar
as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier." 48 STAT. 1066 (1934), 47
U.S.C. § 153(h) (1952).
Licensing of carriers in communications is governed by FCC v. Radio Corp., 346
U.S. 86 (1953), where the Commission was held to have erred in licensing a radio-
telegraph company on the basis of a supposed national or congressional policy in favor
of competition. The case was remanded with instructions for the Commission to decide,
as an expert body, whether the grant would serve the public interest. Id. at 97. "The Act
by its terms prohibits competition by those whose entry does not satisfy the 'public
interest' standard." Id. at 93.
11. "[W]e cannot assume that Congress intended for us to prevent free competition
in certain instances and yet not impose regulatory substitutes in such instances." 13 RADIO
REG. at 150.
12. " 'The erection of a fence around an industry to keep out newcomers is wholly
repugnant to the policy which underlies our anti-trust legislation. . . .' yet that is precisely
what the protestant requests us to do. The protestant cannot justify an exception in his
case because it claims that injury to the protestant will result in an injury to the public.
This has been the habitual and historic allegation made by persons who are interested
in avoiding or preventing competition." Id. at 146. See also note 13 infra.
13. 48 STAT. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 311 (1952) ; 48 STAT. 1087 (1934),
47 U.S.C. §§ 313-14 (1952).
One of the act's main objectives was to prevent anyone from gaining excessive control
over a means of communication which was capable of exerting tremendous influence
over the public. See 67 Cotc. RE c. 5479-81, 5484, 5487, 12352, 12356-58 (1926) ; 68 CoNG.
REc. 2573, 2575 (1927) (discussing Radio Act of 1927, from which the antitrust provisions
of the Communications Act were derived). Congress sought to avoid both private monopoly
and too much regulation, either of which could lead to interference with the free ex-
pression of ideas. See 48 STAT. 1091 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1952) : "Nothing
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not to limit the Commission's authority to grant or deny licenses in the public
interest.14 In addition, the Commission has stated that section 153(h) does
not preclude application of common carrier accounting concepts when neces-
sary to the proper discharge of its duty to administer radio licensing.1 a Section
153 (h) merely prevents use of title two of the act, dealing with common carriers,
as a source of authority over radio. It need not be taken as limiting the power to
license radio or other broadcasting granted in title three.' 6 Nor does section
in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of
censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station,
and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which
shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio communication." See also
43 STAT. 1088 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1952) (prohibiting private censor-
ship of speeches by candidates for public office).
14. "While it is true that it was the intention of Congress to preserve competition
in broadcasting, and while it is true that such intention was written into Section 314 of
the Communications Act, it certainly does not follow therefrom that Congress intended
the Commission to grant or deny an application in any case, other than in the interest
of the public. Just as a monopoly-which may result from the action of the Commission
in licensing too fev stations-may be detrimental to the public interest, so may destruc-
tive competition, effected by the granting of too many licenses. The test is not whether
there is a monopoly, on the one hand, or an overabundance of competition, on the other,
but whether the granting or denying of the application will best serve the interest of
the public." Yankee Network, Inc. v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
The antitrust provisions of the Communications Act bar certain concentrated holders
from competing. See 48 STAT. 1087, 47 U.S.C. § 314 (1952) (prohibiting the granting
of a license when "the purpose is and/or the effect thereof may be to substantially lessen
competition or to restrain commerce . ..or unlawfully to create monopoly in any line
of commerce"). Consequently, far from being inconsistent with antitrust policy, Com-
mission power to restrict competition may sometimes be used for antitrust purposes. "The
method of uncontrolled competition argued for by the Commission in the present case
is in fact one way of creating monopolies ... [by leaving] in the field only monopolies
which were sufficiently supported financially to withstand the destructive competition
which might result from arbitrary, careless action on the part of the Commission in the
granting of new station licenses." Yankee Netvork, Inc. v. FCC, supra at 223-24.
15. See The Travelers Broadcasting Serv. Corp., 6 F.C.C. 456, 463-64 (1938), on
rehearing, 7 F.C.C. 504 (1939) (new findings of fact and opinion issued, but transfer still
denied) :
"[Ifn considering applications for authority to transfer control of licensee corporations
such as the one discussed herein, the Commission must in each instance determine primarily
whether or not a grant thereof would serve public interest, but it is not bound by strict
principles of accounting such as would be applicable in rate proceedings governing com-
mon carriers. It is well settled, however, in numerous decisions in such proceedings, that
past losses in operation may not be capitalized in the valuation of property for rate-making
purposes.... Under Section 3 (h) of the Act, supra, a person engaged in radio broadcasting
is not deemed to be a common carrier, and the [carrier] ... cases are not, therefore, strictly
applicable. However, the principle expressed therein is one which the Commission recog-
nizes to be in accordance with sound public policy. To permit, therefore, prior losses
in the operation of Station WTIC, and its affiliated short-wave stations, to be capitalized
in the manner proposed herein .. .would not be in the public interest."
16. Congress believed that the highly complex field of radio required an expert body
wijth broad power to consider whatever it believed was relevant to the public well-being.
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153(h), excluding broadcasting from the title two provisions for close super-
vision of common carriers, warrant the inference that Congress intended
competition to be preserved notwithstanding the public interest.1r Such a con-
clusion assumes that Congress considered free competition and close super-
vision sole and mutually exclusive methods of insuring that the public interest
would be adequately subserved.18 But Congress could have thought the license
renewal and revocation provisions sufficient to maintain good service. 19 And, it
might have recognized that exclusion of one competitor does not destroy the safe-
guards of competition. A station must still provide good service to compete
successfully for advertising with other media and with other stations serving
the area.
20
See S. RFP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) ; National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134,
137-38 (1940).
17. Yankee Network, Inc. v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (rejecting
the argument that the fact that radio is not regulated as a common carrier implies that
the Commission may not protect radio against competition).
18. Cf. "Thus against speculative and at the most temporary injury to the public
interest as a result of competition we must weigh the very real and permanent injury
to the public which would result from restriction of competition within a regulatory
scheme designed for a competitive industry and without the safeguards where government
seeks to guarantee to any business enterprise greater security than it can obtain by its
own competitive ability." The Voice of Cullman, 14 F.C.C. 770, 776 (1950).
19. 48 STAT. 1084, 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(d), 312 (1952). Com-
mission practice has minimized the effectiveness of these provisions in controlling station
behavior. The power of revocation is seldom used, and the fact that the licensee has made
a large investment in the station has induced the Commission to grant renewals except
in cases of exceptional disregard of the public interest. Thus, between 1934 and 1942,
only two licenses were revoked, and thirteen applications for renewal were denied. See
Comments, 57 YALE L.J. 275, 280 n26 (1947), 66 YALE L.J. 365, 370, 379-80 & nn.87-91
(1957).
Nevertheless, stations may be spurred to better service by the knowledge that their
records of past performance will be carefully considered in future licensing proceedings,
should they desire to establish new stations. See, e.g., WORZ, Inc., 12 RADIo REG. 1157,
1213-15 (June 6, 1957) ; WPTF Radio Co., 12 RArio REG. 609, 636-46, 658d-660 (1956).
In any event, congressional intent must be gleaned from the powers to regulate given the
Commission, not the disuse into which they have fallen.
20. See Southeastern Enterprises (WCLE), 13 RADio REG. 139, 142 (March
20, 1957) (Cleveland area served by stations in other communities). Even where local
merchants do not advertise on stations in nearby communities, a local station must main-
tain good service or risk loss of its audience and subsequent decline in advertising revenue.
See Dye Report 19.
Broadcasting is not the most favored form of advertising. In 1955, less than 20% of total
national advertising expenditures were attributable to radio-television. Direct mail adver-
tising accounted for 24.0% of expenditures, newspapers 142%, magazines 13.7%, network
television 9.8%, trade publications 7.8%, spot television 5.8%, spot radio 2.6%, outdoor
2.5%, network radio 1.7%, miscellaneous 18.7%. Memorandum prepared by the Columbia
Broadcasting System, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on S. Res. 13 and S. Res. 163, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1759-60 (1956). See also
Dye Report 25-31, indicating that radio is less favored than other types of local advertising.
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Similarly, policy considerations advanced in other cases but not expressed
in Southeastern Enterprises fail to support the decision. Justification cannot
be found in the rationale that failure of an existing station through entry of a
competitor ultimately leaves the area in its original position.2' Public harm
is ordinarily apparent when a new station destroys two or more existing broad-
casters,2 2 or when both old and new stations are forced off the air.23 For subse-
quent entry, though sometimes possible, does not justify depriving listeners of
service in the interim.2 4 Even where only one station is driven out, however,
the public suffers if the defunct station was preferable. Thus, to the extent
diversification of ownership is desirable,2 5 public harm results when an inde-
pendent station is forced off the air by a concentrated holder with a superior
competitive position.20 In addition, if the original licensee furnishes the only
service for a substantial group of people not reached by the new station, free
competition thwarts the FCC's primary objective of providing each person
with at least one service. 27 Free competition may also impede the Commission's
21. This theory was most dearly expounded in The Voice of Cullman, 14 F.C.C. 770,
776 (1950) : "[A~ssuming the worst possible results arose from the establishment of the
new station, the situation would be self-correcting and injury to the public, if any, would
be of short duration. If either station by reason of lack of revenue becomes unable to dis-
charge its responsibility of providing a program service in the public interest, that station
will likewise be unable to secure a renewal of license and must leave the field clear for
the other station. If both stations should cease operations, the way would then be open
for the establishment of a new station for which . . .by petitioner's own figures, there
would be adequate support."
See also Presque Isle Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 3, 9 (1940) : "It is implicit in the
idea of free competition that the public interest cannot possibly be affected by the failure
of an existing station to survive due to increased competition, because this result cannot
follow unless the new station's competitive efforts enable it to render a superior public
service."
22. See WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 13 RADIO REG. 763, 808-13 (1956), final
disposition deferrcd, 14 RADIo REG. 976 (Jan. 23, 1957) (new television station will prob-
ably drive two existing stations off the air).
23. See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476 (1940), quoted at
note 5 supra.
24. For discussion of areas in which stations driven out may never be replaced, see
note 39 infra.
25. See Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 365, 366-68 & n.18 (1957) ; note 13 supra.
26. "The 'concentrated' owner can utilize joint facilities and staffs, and combined
advertising services, to realize the cost savings that may be the first step in monopolization."
Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 365, 367 (1957). He also can have the advantage of tying contracts
and a superior bargaining position in competing for network affiliations. Id. at 367-68 &
nn.14, 17. See also Fall River Herald News Publishing Co., 5 F.C.C. 377 (1938)
(license denied applicant who owned only English language newspaper in town and who
was adverse to announcing programs of sole existing station).
27. See, e.g., Radio Cincinnati, Inc. v. FCC, 177 F.2d 92, 95 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (first
electrically satisfactory service for 5,000 people preferred over an additional such service
for 600,000 people).
The Sixth Report and Order of the Federal Communications Commission, which
assigned television channels to different communities throughout the country, was based
on the following priorities: [1] "To provide at least one television service .to all parts
1957]
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policy of encouraging stations which meet local needs.28 The licensing of an
additional large-city station may cause the failure of local services in nearby
communities. 29 And, while listeners in these communities can usually receive the
city station, the programming and advertising it carries may not be adapted to
their interests.30 Nor is a policy of free competition supported by arguing that
of the United States." [21 "To provide each community with at least one television broad-
casting station." [3] "To provide a choice of at least two television services to all parts
of the United States." [4] "To provide each community with at least two television broad-
cast stations." Sixth Report and Order, 1 RADIO REG. 91:601, 91:620 (1952).
In WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 13 RADIO REG. 763, 810-14 (1956), final disposition
deferred, 14 RADIo REG. 976 (Jan. 23, 1957), the hearing examiner found that licensing
the applicant would proably destroy a station providing the only network grade television
for about 27,000 people, and the sole grade A television service for 119,000 people. The
examiner approved the application, although he acknowledged that licensing would defeat
the objectives of the Sixth Report and Order and the statutory requirement of a
"fair, efficient, and equitable distribution" of facilities among communities, 48 STAT. 1084
(1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1952), note 41 infra. He stated that the Com-
mission expected economic facts would preclude full realization of these objectives. WJR,
The Goodwill Station, Inc., supra at 826-27. Final commission action on the problem has
been deferred pending rehearing on the comparative qualifications of WJR and the two
other applicants for the Flint channel. See Butterfield Theatres, Inc. v. FCC, 237 F.2d
552 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (ordering rehearing).
28. See second priority in Sixth Report and Order, note 27 supra; Enid Broadcasting
Co., 14 F.C.C. 1054, 1071 (1950) ; Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 11 F.C.C. 383, 391-92
(1946) (§ 307(b) requires not merely availability of service, but also, wherever possible,
media for local expression).
The television allocation table, 47 C.F.R. § 3.606 (Supp. 1957), was designed to protect
the interest of the "public residing in smaller cities and rural areas." Sixth Report and
Order, 1 RADIo REG. 91:601, 91:604 (1952). For doubts as to its effectiveness, see Commis-
sioner Jones' dissent, id. at 91:1048.
In Southeastern Enterprises, while local service would remain even if the original station
failed, the public might be deprived of the only local nighttime service. Brief for Appellant,
pp. 2, 16, Attachment No. 2, pp. 1, 3, Fitch & Kile, Inc. v. FCC, No. 13868, D.C. Cir.,
June 5, 1957 (claiming night service to be unprofitable and undertaken as a public service,
and that applicant had sought daytime permit only). Even if the existing station did not
fail, the feared competition was alleged to require elimination of the unprofitable night-
time service. Ibid. Nighttime programming may still have been worthwhile, however,
if it tended to keep the public aware of the station and thus to increase the daytime audience.
29. See WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 13 RADIo REG. 763, 808-13 (1956), final
disposition deferred, 14 RADIo REG. 976 (Jan. 23, 1957), where the hearIng examiner
found that applicant, seeking to institute a service in Flint, Michigan, would probably
destroy the local services in Cadillac and Saginaw. The examiner, approving the appli-
cation, stated that "though it would unquestionably be better to have it otherwise, Flint will
have a station at the expense of Saginaw and Cadillac-at least as far as the present
grantees are concerned." Id. at 827. His holding should be construed as a failure to make
the findings on relative need of communities for television service required by § 307(b),
see notes 41, 57 infra, and a failure properly to apply the public interest standard.
30. See WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., supra note 29, at 798 (noting that the
Flint station had made no survey of the interests of the other communities in planning
its programming). WWTV, in Cadillac (pop. 10,425), serves a largely rural area con-
taining many communities of 2,000 to 8,000. Accordingly, it adapted its advertising policy
to the limited financial resources of rural merchants. The Flint (pop. 163,000) station
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the results of competition cannot be predicted, and that allowing a hearing
merely encourages protests lodged for purposes of delay.3 ' Dilatory tactics
can be defeated under a recent Communications Act amendment authorizing
the FCC to permit, when required by the public interest, the new licensee's
continued operation pending the outcome of the protest proceeding.
3 2
The difficulty of predicting the effects of radio competition furnishes no
justification for a decision which declares the FCC powerless to weigh such
considerations in all broadcasting cases. Southeastern Enterprises, based on
the exclusion of broadcasting from close supervision, extends to television as
well as radio. While the outcome of competition among radio stations may
would be most unlikely to adopt a similar policy. See id. at 766, 810-14. Therefore, if the Flint
station replaces the Cadillac station, viewers in the Cadillac market would probably no
longer get advertising from local merchants, and local merchants would be deprived of a
television outlet. See note 52 infra.
31. "[T]he possibility that competition between radio stations may result in detriment
to the public by reason of lowered quality of program service or the complete elimination
of one of the competitors is, as a practical matter, a fact which is incapable of proof. To
permit the existing stations to utilize the protest procedure to force a useless hearing on
these issues would, under such circumstances, appear to be an abuse of process." American
Southern Broadcasters (WPWR), 11 RADIO REG. 1054, 1056, license granted, 13 RADIO
REG. 927 (1955).
"We do not believe that the result of establishing two stations in an area which. at
the time can allegedly support only one can be foreseen. One station may rapidly drive
the other out of business; both stations may survive either by attracting sufficient additional
revenue or by reducing expenses without necessarily degrading their program service
since quality of program service cannot be measured by cost alone; one or both stations
may be content to operate at a loss either permanently or until the business situation
permits the development of additional revenues. The possibilities are numerous, and since
they lie in the future and stem from the interaction of individual purposes, energies, per-
severance, and resourcefulness in a dynamic situation over a period of time, the ultimate
results, and even more the effect of any particular result upon the service rendered
cannot be predicted. Detailed information of the present business situation obtained at a
hearing would not make prediction substantially more possible." The Voice of Cullman,
14 F.C.C. 770, 776 (1950).
32. The protest procedure had been used by competitors effectively to prevent a new
radio or television station from going on the air for as long as two or three years.
See 101 CONG. REc. 11156 (1955) ; 102 CONG. REc. 416-18 (1956). To eliminate such un-
necessary and wasteful delays, the act was amended, 70 STAT. 3 (1956), 47 U.S.C. § 309(c)
(Supp. IV, 1957), to allow a grant of license to remain in effect despite pending protest pro-
ceedings if "the Commission affirmatively finds for reasons set forth in the decision that
the public interest requires that the grant remain in effect .... " See Letcher Broadcast-
ing Corp., 14 RADIO RG. 183 (1956) (grant of license kept in effect pending protest
hearing, as likelihood of need to set grant aside was slight) ; Wrather-Alvarez Broad-
casting, Inc., 13 RADIO REG. 754, license granted, 14 RADIO REG. 213, aff'd, 14 RADIO REG.
218 (1956) (grant remains in effect pending outcome of protest).
When the license is withheld until the applicant can prove his fitness in a hearing,
consideration of the economic injury issue would not appear to cause objectionable delay.
The applicant could not be operating even if no protest had been lodged, and the extent
to which the otherwise necessary hearing would be extended does not seem sufficiently
great to justify classification of the protest as dilatory. See note 3 supra.
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defy prediction,"S the results of television competition are often foreseeable.
The great expense of local television programming generally makes some net-
work service a prerequisite for successful operation. 34 Consequently, where
the entry of a new station with network affiliation is likely to prevent other
broadcasters from obtaining network programming, sufficient ground for pre-
dicting failure of existing stations may be found.35 Moreover, television pre-
sents a distinctive situation in that its broadcast band is divided into two por-
tions: very-high-frequency, VHF, with twelve channels and ultra-high-fre-
quency, UHF, with seventy.3 6 Since comparatively few sets receive the UHF
signal,3 7 programming and advertising sources prefer the VHF medium.3,
33. See note 31 supra.
34. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 37; Plotkin, Memorandum Prepared for the Senate
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-16 (1955) (here-
inafter cited as Memorandum).
35. See WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 13 RADIo RFG. 763, 808-13 (1956), final
disposition deferred, 14 RADIo REG. 976 (Jan. 23, 1957). The hearing examiner found
that entry of a station with CBS affiliation would probably deprive two existing stations
of their CBS programming, without which they could not survive. One existing licensee
testified that he would lose his national "spot" business if he were unable to provide spots
adjacent to network programs, and that loss of CBS programming would force him to
go off the air. The other also expected to lose CBS programming, which accounted for
80% of his national programming and 84% of advertising sales. The examiner conceded
that such loss would make survival very difficult, because "stations with network programs
make money (and make it in direct proportion to the level of such programs carried) ; those
without such programs do not." Id. at 812.
36. VHF has channels 2-13, UHF 14-83. Both bands produce the same type of
picture, but UHF is better suited for color and freer from electrical interference. Hear-
ings, supra note 20, at 21-22. However, UHF signals are more difficult to send over long
distances because they are more sensitive to rough terrain and bend less easily with
the curvature of the earth. Id. at 189. Higher power and perhaps a higher tower may
compensate for this shortcoming, id. at 86, and so the Commission has recently authorized
an increase in maximum UHF power from 1,000 to 5,000 kilowatts. Second Report on
Deintermixture, 13 RADIO REG. 1571, 1585 (1956). The higher bands also have certain
technical difficulties, but the Commission expects these to be eliminated by an expedited
research program to improve UHF transmitters, receivers and techniques. Id. at 1578;
see Hearings, supra note 20, at 153.
37. All sets receive the VHF signal, while only about 15% of sets presently being
made can also receive UHF. Hearings, supra note 20, at 69, 298. From 1948-52, when
the licensing of new stations was suspended pending adoption of a nation-wide television
plan, almost 17 million VHF-only receivers were sold. See Memorandum 3-8. Today,
of 37 million television receivers in the country, only about 4 million receive the UHF
signal. Hearings, supra note 20, at 69.
38. Second Report on Deintermixture, 13 RADIO REG. 1571, 1573 (1956) ; Hearings,
supra note 20, at 125, 126. See also Greylock Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 231
F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir.) (staying Commission order pending appeal on merits), appeal on
merits sub nora. Van Curler Broadcasting Corp. v. United States, 236 F.2d 727 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 935 (1.956).
To give the UHF stations a chance at better programming, it has been suggested that
all stations be limited to one network service, so that one VHF broadcaster cannot obtain
the best programs of three networks. Hearings, supra note 20, at 90. But no action has been
taken on this proposal.
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Thus, as the Commission itself has admitted, licensing an additional VHF
competitor often will have the foreseeable effect of driving existing UHF
operators off the air.39 Under these circumstances, difficulty in foreseeing the
results of competition in radio does not warrant a limitation of commission
power derived from a statute applying equally to radio and television.
Furthermore, Southeastern Enterprises is inconsistent with both prior and
subsequent commission determinations in rule-making proceedings. In hear-
ings on a proposed amendment to the rule limiting the wattage of the most
powerful stations, the FCC considered whether increased power "would un-
favorably affect the economic ability of other stations to operate in the public
interest. '40 Again, under its authority to determine the location of stations,41
the Commission has adopted "deintermixture" rules eliminating VHF channels
which impede development of UHF television. 42 But if the act bars con-
39. See Elmira Deintermixture Case, 15 RADIo REG. 1515, 1523 (Feb. 26, 1957);
Hearings, supra note 20, at 55, 80, 127. See also Greylock Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, supra note 38, at 749; WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 13 RADIO RW. 763, 808-09
(1956), final disposition deferred, 14 RADIo REG. 976 (Jan. 23, 1957).
The survival records of UHF and VHF stations differ significantly. Of 368 VHF
authorizations from 1946-54, only 23 cancelled or suspended operations. In contrast, of
318 UHF authorizations from 1952-54, 118 cancelled or suspended operations because of
economic difficulties. Menwrandum 5. 1957 figures show that of 177 commercial TV
grants cancelled since 1952, 144 were UHF and 33 VHF. Broadcasting, Oct. 14, 1957,
p. 107. Apparently, then, in areas where a UHF station has been destroyed by a VHF,
the possibilities of anyone else attempting to operate another UHF service are slight.
40. 10 FED. REG. 2194 (1945).
41. "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to time,
as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall- . . (d) Determine the location
of classes of stations or individual stations; ... (r) Make such rules and regulations and
prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary
to carry out the provisions of this chapter ... " 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), as amended, 47
U.S.C. § 303 (1952).
"In considering applications for licenses, and modifications and renewals thereof, when
and insofar as there is demand for the same, the Commission shall make such distribution
of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and of power among the several States and
communities as to provide a fair, efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to
each of the same." 48 STAT. 1084 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1952).
Sections 303 and 307(b), taken together, give the Commission authority to establish
a nation-wide plan allocating channels to specific areas. Logansport Broadcasting Corp.
v. United States, 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; see Peoples Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 209 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Under this plan, "an application for a television
broadcast station must request a specific channel provided for in the table of assignments
(§ 3.606 of this chapter) for the city in which the applicant proposes to construct a station."
47 C.F.R. § 1.304 (Supp. 1957). Upon petition by an interested party or on the initiative
of the Commission, proceedings may be instituted to change any rule (including the table
of assignments) if the public interest requires. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.701, 1.702 (Supp. 1957).
42. See, e.g., Elmira Deintermixture Case, 15 RADio REG. 1515, 1523 (Feb. 26, 1957)
"The advent of a VHF station will, in all likelihood, result in less effective competition
among fewer stations. We believe that . . . [deletion of the VHF channel] carries out the
mandate of Section 307(b) of the Communications Act, because it will result in the assign-
ment of frequencies so as to provide a more fair, efficient and equitable distribution of tele-
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sideration of competitive effects in licensing proceedings, it must also preclude
such consideration in rule-making, since rules can be made only "to carry
out the provisions of the Act."'43 Even the Commission, before Southcastern
Enterprises, seemed to recognize no distinction in this regard between licensing
and rule-making.44
By threatening undue constriction of the rule-making power in addition
to removing relevant inquiry from licensing, Southeastern Enterprises under-
mines the aims of the Communications Act. Formerly, the Commission de-
clined to issue rules on problems of competition when it thought preferable
the more flexible regulation afforded by the licensing procedure. On this
ground, it rejected a rule designed to protect local stations against injurious
competition by requiring large-city stations to build within five miles of the
principal community served. 45 Similarly, the case by case approach was deemed
vision service in the Elmira area, and will increase the likelihood of more TV service and
more local TV outlets in that city and surrounding areas. It should be emphasized that in
deleting Channel 9 from Elmira our primary purpose is not to ensure the profitable
operation of particular UHF licensees. Rather, we wish to ensure more effective com-
petition among a greater number of stations in order that the public in Elmira and the
surrounding area will be afforded more and better television service."
See also Springfield Deintermixture Case, 15 RADIO REG. 1539, 1540h (June 20, 1957)
"[D] eintermixture is not contrary to statutory policy of free competition in the broadcast
industry."
,Consideration of whether a VHF channel should be deleted "would depend to a large
extent on such factors as: 1. Whether significant numbers of people would lack service as
a result of the elimination of the VHF channel. 2. Whether one or more UHF stations
are operating in the area. 3. Whether a reasonably high proportion of the sets in use can
receive UHF signals. 4. Whether the terrain is reasonably favorable for UHF coverage.
5. Whether, taking into account all the local circumstances, the elimination of a VHF chan-
nel would be consistent with the objective of improving the opportunities for effective com-
petition among a greater number of stations." Second Report on Deintermixture, 13 RADIO
REG. 1571, 1582 (1956).
VHF channels have been deleted in five areas. Elmira Deintermixture Case, supra;
Springfield Deintermixture Case, 15 RADIO REG. 1525 (Feb. 26, 1957); Peoria Deinter-
mixture Case, 15 RADIO REG. 1550c (Feb. 26, 1957) ; Evansville Deintermixture Case, 15
RADIO REG. 1573 (Feb. 26, 1957) ; Fresno Deintermixture Case, 15 RADIO REG. 1586i (Feb.
26, 1957). However, deintermixture has also been denied. See, e.g., Hartford Deintermixture
Case, 15 RADIO REG. 1540i (Feb. 26, 1957) ; Madison Deintermixture Case, 15 RADIO PG.
1563 (Feb. 26, 1957). In the latter instance, deletion of the VHF channel would have left
some listeners beyond the reach of any television service, id. at 1572, thereby contravening
the requirement of a "fair, efficient, and equitable distribution" of facilities, id. at 1569.
The Commission reversed its decision to delete the VHF channels in Albany-Schenectady-
Troy, and decided instead to make the area all VHF. Unlike the other areas in which
deintermixture occurred, a station was in operation on one of the VHF channels to be
deleted, and its removal would have required lengthy proceedings. Accordingly, the Com-
mission decided that making the area all VHF would best enhance the opportunities for
effective competition. Albany-Schenectady-Troy Channel Assignments, 15 RADIO REG.
1514a (Sept. 5, 1957), reversing 15 RADIO REG. 1501 (Feb. 26, 1957).
43. See note 41 supra.
44. See notes 45, 46 infra and accompanying text.
45. Transmitter Location of Television Stations, 13 RADIO REG. 1530a, 1531-36 (1955).
The rule was sought by the Saginaw UHF station, one of the protestants in WJR, The
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the better means of dealing with the competitive effect on local services of
"translators" relaying programs originating in distant cities. 46 Presumably,
the Commission is now powerless to adopt what it admits is the best solution.
47
IMoreover, protection of UHF television by deintermixture often requires
supplementary action through licensing.48 Deintermixture will proceed more
I
Goodwill Station, Inc., 13 RADIO REG. 763 (1956), final disposition deferred, 14 RADIO
REG. 976 (Jan. 23, 1957). WJR originally applied for Channel 12 in Flint, Michigan, and
proposed to build its transmitter at a point 20 miles southeast of Flint and 50 miles from
Saginaw. After its application was approved, it applied for permission to move its trans-
mitter to a location 23 miles northwest of Flint and 12 miles from Saginaw. Id. at 765,
803. The Saginaw station, which would probably be driven off the air if WJR was granted
the modification, id. at 808-09, 825-27, protested that the competitive results were against
the public interest and violated commission policy under § 307(b) and the Sixth Report
and Order. Ibid. See notes 27,41 supra.
46. Television Translator Stations, 13 RADIO RE. 1561, 1566 (1956). Translators,
employing relatively inexpensive, low-powered equipment, receive the signals of existing
television stations and convert them for retransmission on one of the upper 14 UHF
channels. Id. at 1561.
47. In WJR, the Goodwill Station, Inc., 13 RADIO REG. 763 (1956), final disposition
deferred, 14 RADIO REG. 976 (Jan. 23, 1957), despite the decision in the rule-making pro-
ceeding that the problem was better handled in licensing, see note 45 supra and accompany-
ing text, the hearing examiner at the licensing hearing foreshadowed Southeastern Enter-
prises by stating that he was without authority to protect the protestants against the appli-
cant "exercising its right of free and fair competition." WJR, The Goodwill Station,
Inc., supra at 826-27.
48. See notes 45, 46 supra and accompanying text.
Should the Commission adopt a proposed rule abandoning the television allocation
table with respect to stations more than 250 miles from the Canadian and Mexican Borders,
the need to use the licensing procedure to protect UHF stations will be even greater. See
22 FED. REG. 3076-78 (1957). While this proposal contemplates some degree of protection
for UHF stations (no VHF can be licensed within 75 miles of a UHF), it withholds pro-
tection in the very instances in which it is most needed. For although UHF stations can
often survive one VHF station, but not two, Hearings, supra note 20, at 55, the 75 mile
requirement is waived if a VHF station is already within the 75 mile limit, or if the UHF
station competes with two or more existing VHF stations. Thus UHF stations, formerly
protected against additional VHF competition by lack of available VHF assignments
in their areas would be threatened by new VHF applicants. Licensing would thus become
the only means of excluding VHFs excepted from the 75 mile requirement. See 1 RADIO
REG. 53:588 (April 24, 1957) (dissent opposing proposed rule as harmful to solution of
UHF problem).
By considering the economic injury in licensing proceedings, the Commission can induce
applicants to modify their proposals to minimize harmful UHF-VHF competition. For
instance, an applicant for a station in an area where both UHF and VHF channel assign-
ments are available would normally choose the VHF. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 15.
However, he might be persuaded to apply for the UIF channel if the Commission were
likely to deny a VHF application on the ground that the public interest required protection
of existing UHF channels against VHF competition. Filling all UHF channels before
admitting VHF applicants enhances the likelihood of eventual successful operation by both
UHF and VHF stations in the area, because UHFs commencing operation before VHFs
have a better chance of survival. See id. at 9.
Furthermore, consideration of possible injury to UHF stations in licensing procedures
may induce VHF applicants to locate transmitters so as to minimize the competitive effect
on neighboring UHFs. See notes 45, 47 supra and accompanying text.
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smoothly if the Commission is empowered to bar VHF applicants from areas
in which reallocation of channels is likely. 49 And where complete deletion
of VHF channels is either undesirable or in the long run unnecessary, con-
sideration of competition would enable the FCC to refuse VHF applications
until enough UHF-VHF receivers were in use to assure substantial UHF
survival.50 Finally, deintermixture itself may be threatened if Southeastern
Enterprises is carried to its logical conclusion. For if the assertion that Con-
gress intended broadcasting to be freely competitive were applied to rule-
making as well as licensing, protection of UHF stations by any means would
become impossible.51 Yet, since only twelve VHF channels exist, a truly
competitive system of nationwide television can only be achieved through
development of UHF service.
52
49. See Albany-Schenectady-Troy Channel Assignments, 15 RADIO REG. 1514a, 1514g-
14j (Sept. 5, 1957) (deintermixture denied since existing station operated on one of the
VHF channels, and removal of that station would require lengthy proceedings; area
made all VHF instead) ; Hearings, supra note 20, at 24; cf. Greylock Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, 231 F.2d 748, 750 (D.C. Cir.) (staying commission order assigning
new VHF channel to area where deintermLxture proceedings were pending), disposition
on merits sub nom. Van Curler Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 236 F.2d 727, 730-32
(D.C. Cir.) (dissenting opinion; objecting to court's affirming commission assignment
of VHF channels to area where deintermixture proceedings were pending), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 935 (1956). But see Coastal Bend Television Co. v. FCC, 234 F.2d 686 (D.C.
Cir. 1956) (licensing of VHF applicants pending outcome of deintermixture proceedings
upheld as within commission discretion).
50. Deletion may be undesirable since the VHF station, with longer range than UHF,
may be required to give service to outlying areas. Hearings, supra note 20, at 14;
Madison Deintermixture Case, 15 RADio RE. 1563, 1569 (Feb. 26, 1957) (deletion of
VHF would deprive -some people of service).
If an area is kept predominantly UHF, people will likely replace old sets with all-
channel receivers, Greylock Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra note 49, despite the
slightly higher cost of such receivers ($25-$30). Hearings, supra note 20, at 70. Alterna-
tively, they may be induced to undertake the expense of converting VHF sets to UHF
($30-$35 plus cost of adjusting antenna). Hearings, supra note 20, at 79.
Exclusion of the VHF stations probably will not need to exceed six years, the average
life of television receivers. Id. at 292. Deprivation for this period would be balanced
against the benefits of an ultimately greater number of stations in the area than would
otherwise have been possible.
An alternative solution would be available were Congress to repeal the 10% federal
excise tax on all-channel receivers, thus making such receivers about equal in price with
nonexempt VHF-only sets. See id. at 70.
51. The FCC attaches so great importance to the development of UHF television
that such interpretation of Southeastern Enterprises is doubtful. In fact, the Commission
has stated that the most promising solution to the UHF-VHF problem is shifting all
television to UHF. FCC ANN. REP. 95 (1956). Since accomplishment of this aim would
require a number of years, the Commission has used deintermixture as an interim solution.
Second Report on Deintermixture, 13 RADio REaG. 1571, 1576, 1581 (1956). Even if a
court were favorable to UHF stations, it would, if confronted with the Southeastern
Enterprises issue, have difficulty in reconciling protection through rules with lack of power
to protect in licensing.
52. Id. at 1572; Hearings, supra note 20, at 24. As of July 1956, almost 25% of the
population could receive no more than one station. FCC ANN. REP. 93 (1956). With more
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Considering whether economic injury adversely affects the public interest
does not detract from preservation of competitive broadcasting. The protestant,
raising the issue of economic injury, has the burden of proving that the new
station will cause public harm.53 To meet this burden, he must show that
supervening policies of the Communications Act require restriction of com-
petition. When the effects of competition are unforeseeable, protestant will be
unable to sustain his burdenY4i Even if foreseeability presents no problem,
stations, the public would have wider choice of programs. The limited number of stations
injures small businesses, which often cannot buy time because wealthier competitors are
able to secure the limited time available. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 134, 175, 176, 303.
And where only one or two stations serve an area, only one or two network shows may be
heard. Thus, some networks with shows to sell do not have sufficient outlets, and the de-
velopment of competitive national networks is hampered. Id. at 175. See Memorandum 5-6;
Jones, Progress Report Prepared for the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-78 (1955).
53. See, e.g., Letcher Broadcasting Corp., 14 RADIO REG. 183, 187-88 (1956) (burden
of proof and of demonstrating relevancy on protestant) ; Coos County Broadcasters, 13
RAD-o REG. 626, 632 (1956) (burden of proving economic injury on protestant), license
granted, 14 RADIO REG. 921, 924-25 (Dec. 21, 1956) (allegations of economic injury too
speculative to warrant hearing) ; Southeastern Enterprises (WCLE), 12 RADIO REG. 578,
5.O (1955) (hearing on economic injury issues; protestant must prove injury and also
demonstrate its relevancy), license granted, 13 RADIO REG. 139 (March 20, 1957) ; Cumber-
land Valley Broadcasting Co., 11 RADIO Ra. 840 (1954) (protestant has burden of
prov ing both facts and materiality of economic injury issue).
54. See, e.g., Spartan Radiocasting Co., 13 RADIO REG. 589, 609 (1956) (permit granted
upon failure of protestant to sustain burden of proof on allegations of economic injury) ;
Neptune Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 96, 98 (1940) (license granted; insufficient evidence
to allow Commission to make findings on economic injury issue).
In Southeastern Enterprises, and in every succeeding case involving allegations of
economic injury adversely affecting the public, one or two Commissioners were able to
concur in the granting of the license without depending on the position that they lacked
authority to consider the matter. See West Georgia Broadcasting Co., 14 RADIO REG. 275
(Aug. 1, 1957); Iredell Broadcasting Co., 13 RADIO REG. 996 (July 18, 1957); Lebanon
Broadcasting Co., 14 RADIO REG. 297, 320 (May 1, 1957); Midland Empire Broadcasting
Co., 14 RADIO REG. 201, 206 (April 17, 1957); Kaiser Hawaiian Village Television, Inc.,
15 RADio REG. 85, 87 (April 5, 1957). The concurring Commissioners reached the same
result as the majority in Southeastern Enterprises by citing protestant's failure to sustain
his burden of proof and by holding that the Commission, though authorized to consider
economic injury, should disregard it for the policy reasons stated in The Voice of Cullman,
14 F.C.C. 770, 775-76 (1950). 13 RADIO REG. at 153-54. See notes 21, 31 supra.
Although the economic injury question should properly be treated by evaluating the
evidence of the protestant and determining whether he meets his burden of proof, disre-
garding the issue on the grounds of the policy in Cullnan is still a more reasonable solution
than Southeastern Enterprises. That policy, based in part on the general unpredictability
of radio competition, would presumably leave the Commission free to deal with the prob-
lems of television, where prediction is often possible. But it is questionable whether the
administrative convenience of ignoring the issue in most radio cases would justify denying
relief in those rare instances where the outcome of competition is predictable. And,
unfortunately, the policy enunciated in Culhnan has been extended to television as well,
with apparent disregard of the peculiar problems that medium presents. See Wrather-
Alvarez Broadcasting, Inc., 13 RADIO REG. 754, 755 (protestant must show relevancy of
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the presumption that competition is beneficial will generally rule.5 But in the
rare cases where true public injury can be shown, and in areas like UHF-
VHF where preservation of competition requires protection of individual
competitors, the Commission will be able to insure effectuation of the act's
purpose to promote the public interest. Southeastern Enterprises presents
no insurmountable obstacle to future consideration of competitive injury. The
courts have not directly ruled on the issue,5 6 and the Commission, not strictly
bound by stare decisis, can reject the decision's reasoning and avoid ultimate
inability to refuse licenses which foster competition subverting the public
interest.
57
economic injury; Commission stated that failure of both existing and proposed television
stations would not be relevant, citing Cullman), license granted, 14 RADIO REG. 213, 218
(1956) (insufficient evidence for Commission to make finding on economic injury issue) ;
W-VVSW, Inc., 14 RADio REG. 492, 494-95 (1956) (economic injury in television not con-
sidered; allegations of harm to public too conjectural, and effects of competition must be
disregarded, citing Cullman).
55. See Wrather-Alvarez Broadcasting, Inc., supra note 54, at 755.
56. A fair amount of dicta supports the contention that economic injury adversely
affecting the public is ground for denial of a license. See note 5 supra. And a circuit court,
granting on several grounds, including the economic injury holding, a petition to stay
the Commission order in Southeastern Enterprises pending appeal, stated that "the proba-
bilities of success appear to lie heavily with appellant." Fitch & Kile, Inc. v. FCC, No.
13868, D.C. Cir., June 5, 1957. However, the same court vacated the stay order, Fitch
& Kile, Inc. v. FCC, D.C. Cir. June 26, 1957, and the appeal was withdrawn.
57. See WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153 F.2d 623, 631 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 329 U.S. 223
(1946); Powel Crosley, Jr. (Avco Case), 11 F.C.C. 3 (1945).
A loophole in Southeastern Enterprises may enable the Commission to grant protection
against competition without explicitly rejecting the case. The Commission stated in passing
that except for cases involving a § 307(b) issue, see note 41 supra, an applicant does not
have to show a "need" for his station. 13 RArio REG. at 148. The remark presumably indi-
cated that a choice between mutually exclusive applications for different communities is
made on the basis of which community has greater need for a new station, even if that
station is less highly qualified than the other applicant. See FCC v. Allentown Broad-
casting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 360-62 (1955), remanding 222 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1954), on
remand, 232 F.2d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1015 (1956). Subsequent
decisions have construed this to mean that § 307(b) cases were "perhaps" excluded from
the holding in Southeastern Enterprises. See, e.g., West Georgia Broadcasting Co., 14
RADio REG. 275 (Aug. 1, 1957). A broad interpretation of § 307(b) could remove compe-
tition problems in radio or television involving more than one community from the holding
in Southeastern Enterprises.
However, the case does not actually justify this result, for the main grounds of the
decision-antitrust policy, § 153 (h) and congressional intent-do not provide support for
distinguishing § 307(b) issues. Furthermore, since § 307(b) will not apply when only one
community is involved, use of that section would improperly make consideration of eco-
nomic injury depend on chance rather than basic policy issues.
